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In this episode, we focus on a skill that matters a lot in A I security and also in cybersecurity more broadly: how to evaluate vendor claims without being swayed by confident marketing. When you are new to this field, it is easy to assume that a vendor’s security statements are trustworthy because they sound professional, use familiar buzzwords, and are presented with polished graphics. Vendors often say things like they use encryption, they follow best practices, and they take security seriously, and none of that is automatically false. The problem is that those phrases are usually too vague to protect you when something goes wrong, and they can hide important limitations or exceptions. Auditing vendor claims means turning broad statements into specific, testable questions and then asking for evidence that the controls exist and are operating. It also means understanding how contracts translate security promises into obligations, because where your visibility ends, a contract often becomes one of your strongest levers. Your goal here is to learn to stay calm, avoid getting sold, and assess whether the vendor’s controls match the real risk in how the A I service will be used.

Before we continue, a quick note: this audio course is a companion to our course companion books. The first book is about the exam and provides detailed information on how to pass it best. The second book is a Kindle-only eBook that contains 1,000 flashcards that can be used on your mobile device or Kindle. Check them both out at Cyber Author dot me, in the Bare Metal Study Guides Series.

The first step is to recognize the difference between a claim and a control. A claim is a statement like we are secure, we are compliant, or we protect your data. A control is a specific safeguard, like all customer data is encrypted in transit using strong protocols, access to production systems requires multi-factor authentication, and privileged access is logged and reviewed. Claims are easy to make because they do not force anyone to define what they mean. Controls are harder because they describe concrete behavior that can be checked. When you listen to a vendor, you want to translate every major claim into a control question that can be answered with evidence. For example, if the vendor says they do not train on your data, you should ask what data they store, how long they retain it, who can access it, and whether any part of it is used for debugging or improvement. If the vendor says they have strong access controls, you should ask how they grant access, how they limit it, and how they detect misuse. This is not about mistrust; it is about clarity, because security decisions cannot be made on slogans.

A useful beginner technique is to focus on the parts of the system that carry the highest consequence if something fails. In A I vendor relationships, those parts are usually data handling, identity and access, change management, and incident response. Data handling is critical because prompts, outputs, and connected documents may contain sensitive information, and A I services can collect more context than people realize. Identity and access matters because vendor staff, vendor systems, and vendor integrations may have powerful privileges. Change management matters because a hosted model can change behavior without you installing anything, which can break assumptions and controls. Incident response matters because even strong controls can fail, and you need to know how quickly the vendor will detect, contain, and notify you. By centering your evaluation on these consequence areas, you avoid being distracted by features that sound impressive but do not reduce risk. You also reduce the chance of missing a simple but severe gap, like a contract that allows broad data retention or a support process that gives many employees access to customer content.

Let’s talk about evidence, because that is how you avoid getting sold. Evidence can take several forms, but the most important feature is that it is verifiable and specific. A vendor may provide independent assessment reports, security whitepapers, architecture diagrams, policy summaries, or descriptions of operational practices. Those can be useful, but they vary in quality, and some are written for marketing rather than risk. Evidence that is stronger tends to describe how the control is implemented, how it is enforced, and how it is monitored. For example, a good explanation of encryption includes what data is encrypted, when it is encrypted, where keys are stored, and who can access the keys. A good explanation of access control includes how roles are defined, how privileged access is approved, and how access is reviewed. A good explanation of logging includes what events are logged, how long logs are kept, and whether logs are protected from tampering. You are not trying to force the vendor to reveal trade secrets; you are trying to learn whether there is substance behind the claims.

When you audit vendor claims, you also need to watch for common patterns that make claims sound strong while leaving loopholes. One pattern is broad language with undefined terms, such as secure by design, enterprise-grade, or industry-standard, which do not commit the vendor to specific behaviors. Another pattern is partial truth, such as saying data is encrypted, without saying whether encryption applies to backups, logs, or temporary processing storage. A third pattern is hiding exceptions in small print, such as not training on customer data, but still using it for service improvement or troubleshooting. A fourth pattern is shifting responsibility, such as implying that the customer is responsible for configuring everything securely, while also limiting the customer’s visibility and control. When you see these patterns, your next move is to ask for specificity and scope, because security is often lost in the edge cases and exceptions. The goal is not to trap the vendor; it is to avoid being surprised later by an assumption that was never actually guaranteed.

Contracts are where claims become enforceable, and this is one of the most important beginner lessons for vendor evaluation. A contract should clearly define what data the vendor can collect, what they can do with it, how long they can keep it, and how it will be protected. It should also define breach notification expectations, including how quickly the vendor must notify you after discovering an incident and what information they must provide. Another key contract area is subcontractors, meaning whether the vendor can share data with other companies and under what conditions. For A I vendors, you also want clarity on model training and improvement, because the difference between using your data to provide the service versus using it to improve the model can be huge. A good contract makes these points explicit, not implied. When you audit a contract, you are effectively auditing the vendor relationship’s security boundary, because the contract defines what happens in the areas you cannot observe directly.

Another contract topic that matters for A I is change control and service evolution. Many hosted services reserve the right to change features, update models, and adjust safety filters, which is understandable from the vendor’s perspective, but it can create risk for the customer. You want to know whether the vendor will notify you of significant changes, whether you can opt out of certain changes, whether you can pin to specific versions, and what options exist if a change causes harm or breaks compliance expectations. Even if you cannot negotiate every detail, the evaluation should at least identify where you are exposed to changes that could shift risk. You also want to understand service availability commitments, because outages can become security issues if they disrupt monitoring, incident response, or critical decision processes. A contract that provides no meaningful visibility into changes and no meaningful remedies for failures leaves you vulnerable. Auditing this area means confirming that operational realities match the level of dependency your organization is placing on the vendor.

Control evidence should not stop at documents, because real security is also about what the vendor does day to day. You want to evaluate whether the vendor has practices that reduce risk in operations, such as strong internal authentication, strict role separation, employee background checks where appropriate, and monitored administrative activity. You also want to know whether they have processes for vulnerability management, patching, and incident response in their own environment. For A I vendors, it is especially important to know whether they monitor for abuse patterns like model extraction attempts, prompt bypass probing, and unusual usage spikes. If the vendor provides no operational evidence and no transparency into monitoring, then you may be relying on hope rather than control. A strong vendor should be able to explain their monitoring approach at a high level without exposing sensitive details. When you audit, you listen for whether they can describe detection and response as real processes with responsibilities and timelines, not just as intentions.

A practical way to avoid getting sold is to make sure your evaluation questions connect to your specific use case. Vendors sometimes present a menu of security features that sound impressive, but the relevance depends on how you will use the service. If your organization will send sensitive internal documents into the system, then data retention and access controls matter heavily. If your organization will allow end users to interact with the model directly, then abuse monitoring and rate limiting matter heavily. If the model will call tools or trigger actions, then authorization controls and logging of tool calls matter heavily. If you will integrate the service into a critical workflow, then uptime commitments and change notifications matter heavily. By tying questions to actual data flows and impacts, you prevent the conversation from drifting into generic claims. You also make it easier to decide whether evidence is sufficient, because you know what risks must be reduced for your use case to be safe.

The last part of auditing vendor claims is knowing what to do when evidence is incomplete, because no vendor relationship is perfect. Sometimes the vendor cannot share certain details, or the contract language is mostly standard, or the control evidence is high level. In those cases, you shift from trying to prove security to managing risk through design choices and compensating controls. For example, you might reduce data exposure by limiting what information is sent to the vendor, by using redaction, or by restricting which internal repositories are connected. You might reduce access risk by using scoped credentials, strict network controls, and monitoring on your side. You might reduce change risk by testing model behavior regularly and keeping a fallback process if outputs become unreliable. The evaluation mindset is not all or nothing; it is about understanding the gaps clearly and deciding whether the remaining risk is acceptable. The biggest danger for beginners is not that a vendor has gaps, but that the customer never discovers them until an incident forces the truth into the open.

As you conclude, remember that auditing A I vendor claims is a discipline of turning words into evidence and turning evidence into risk decisions. You avoid getting sold by translating vague statements into specific control questions, focusing on high-consequence areas like data handling and access, and treating contracts as part of your control set. You look for evidence that controls exist and operate, not just polished assurances, and you watch for loopholes hidden in exceptions and undefined terms. When evidence is incomplete, you adjust your design and monitoring to reduce exposure and create compensating safeguards. This approach is not confrontational; it is professional, and it protects both the customer and the vendor by making expectations clear. If you can do this well, you will be able to evaluate A I vendor relationships where your visibility ends, while still making decisions that are grounded, defensible, and aligned with real-world security needs.